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THE UNITED STATES HOUSING ACT: MUNICIPAL
RIGHTS AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
I. Introduction
The problem of providing decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for every
American citizen is national in its scope.' However, it is recognized that the
primary responsibility for its solution should be left with local communities.'
Under the United States Housing Act, there are many ways in which the federal
government can and should render financial and technical aid and advice to
local communities which determine that they want that assistance.3
The main prerequisite to participation in this extensive federal housing
program is still local determination of need and local consent to the project.
Consent is required at several stages in the project and in several forms. For
example, consent is required in the form of a resolution before an initial planning
survey can even be made; in some states, consent takes the form of voter referendum of approval; and finally, consent is evidenced in a cooperation agreement,
the last stage before final agreements are entered between the federal government
and the local housing authority. Without local approval or consent, there can
be no federal assistance.
A variety of recent federal court actions have defined the limitations on a
municipality to control housing programs financed by the federal government.'
This note will briefly examine the judicial approach to the question of whether
a municipality can refuse to cooperate.
A. FederalFramework
The United States Housing Act of 1937' is the basic enabling legislation for
public housing programs. The 1937 Act, fully developed by its subsequent
amendments, established a federal housing agency6 authorized to grant federal
financial and technical assistance to state agencies for slum clearance and lowincome housing projects built and managed by local housing authorities. 7 In the
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1441 (1970).
2 S. Rep. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), 2 U.S. Code Cong. Service 1550-51 (1949).

3 Id.

4 E.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); United Farmworkers of Florida Housing
Project, Inc. v. City of Deray Beach, Florida, 493 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974); Kennedy Park
Homes Assn. v. Lackawanna, New York, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
1010 (1971); Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization (SASSO) v. City of Union
City, California, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970); Citizens Committee for Faraday Wood v.
Lindsay, 362 F. Supp. 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio
1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973); Gautreaux v. Chicago
Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969), aff'd 486 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 922 (1971).
5 5G Stat. 888 (1937), as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401 et seq. (1970).
6 The original "authorized agency" to administer federal financial assistance was the
United States Housing Authority. This was followed by the Public Housing Administration
(PHA) which was later succeeded by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and
finally the Department5 of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).

7 24 C.F.R. § 27 .1(e) (1973) defines "Local Authority" as "[a]ny State, county, munic-

ipality, or other governmental entity or public body which is authorized to engage in the
development or administration of low-rent Housing or slum clearance. A 'Local Authority' is
a public housing agency as defined in the [United States Housing] Act."
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Housing Act of 1937, Congress declared that the public housing program may
not be put into force in an area unless there has been "demonstrated . . .that

there is a need for such low-rent housing which is not being met by private
enterprise."8
In the Housing Act of 1949, the cooperation agreement9 requirement was
added to the United States Housing Act. This requirement makes the low-income
housing program a local option. Initial determinations of whether the private
housing market has failed, whether there are significant slums or blight areas
which need to be eliminated, and whether the local governmental unit desires to
bear the expenses of participation in the program are to be made by local governments. This determination of need may be made by a local governing body or
may be put to a vote of a local electorate if state legislation allows referendums.
Once a local determination has been made that a housing problem exists requiring federal funds, then local consent to a federally funded program is evidenced
by entering a "cooperation agreement" contract. Without this consent no federal agency may make any contract for loans or for annual contributions for any
low-income housing project unless the governing body of the locality has entered
into an agreement with the local housing authority providing for cooperation."
A cooperation agreement spells out the ways in which a municipality must
cooperate with the local housing authority in the development of a housing
project. The local government body must agree to provide all municipal services
for the units and to waive all real and personal property taxes on the property.'
The local services which must be provided include schools, police and fire protection, sanitary sewers, drains, streets, and lighting. In addition, the locality must
also agree to take action in the dedication, sale, or lease of property for the
project; the adoption of zoning ordinances necessary to permit such projects; the
creation of parks and other recreational facilities; and the elimination of a
number of unsafe, unsanitary, or unfit dwellings within the community equal to
the number of units to be contained in a project. 2
In consideration for these actions by a local government, cooperation agreements provide for the reimbursement of municipalities for some of their expenditures by authorizing uniform payments in lieu of taxes (PILOT) equal to
10 percent of the housing project's shelter rents.'" However, local housing authorities fix rents in accordance with the tenants' ability to pay rather than the

8 42 U.S.C. § 1415(7) (a) (ii) (1970). See, 42 U.S.C. § 1415(7) (b) (ii) (1970).
9 24 C.F.R. § 275.1(f) (1973) defines a "Cooperation Agreement" as "[a] contract
between a Local Authority and the governing body of the locality providing for tax exemption,
elimination of unsafe and unsanitary dwelling units, supplying of public services and other
forms of cooperation by the local government, and for payments in lieu of taxes by the local
authority in connection with a low rent housing project."
10 42 U.S.C. § 1415(7) (b) (1970).
11 See 42 U.S.C. § 1410(h) (1970).
'12 These are the standard provisions of a "cooperation agreement" as required by 42

U.S.C. § 1410 (1970).
13 In the standard cooperation agreement contract form "shelter rents" are defined to
mean the total of all charges to tenants of a project for dwelling rents and nondwelling rents
(excluding all other income from such project), less the cost to the local housing authority of
all dwelling and nondwelling utilities.
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economic value of the unit. 4 Thus payments in lieu of taxes (PILOT) rarely
equal full real estate taxes upon property of equivalent value.
B. State Legislation
The federal laws require the consent or cooperation of the municipality with
the local housing authority. Therefore, in order for a state to participate in the
low-income housing program, it must pass any necessary constitutional amendments and statutes establishing local housing authorities (LHA's). Such legislation must grant the LHA's the power of eminent domain, the authority to issue
and secure bonds, to assume financial obligations, and to make agreements
necessary for guaranteeing low rents. All fifty states have enacted such enabling
legislation. 5
There are more than 3,000 such local authorities throughout the United
States. These housing authorities are typically quasi-autonomous corporate bodies
established by local government pursuant to state laws for the purpose of developing, ow ing, and managing low-income housing projects." The housing authorities1 7 which administer the low-income housing program at the local level vary
in form but generally operate under the direction of a Board of Commissioners."
LHA boards have the primary responsibility for planning projects, setting income
limits, determining specific criteria for admission to public housing, and making
other appropriate administrative decisions.
Whatever its particular organizational form may be, the LHA is the party to
whom the local governing body must give its consent for the low-income housing
project. Without the existence of either the legislatively authorized LHA or the
local consent and cooperation, there can be no federally aided low-income housing
project.
II. Local Consent
Even before a project is proposed, a municipality may have the right to
absolutely determine that it does not want or need federal assistance in solving any
of its housing problems and may refuse to give its consent. A traditional form
of such control is home rule. Home rule is a state constitutional or statutory
14

Of course, these rents are set artificially low; see, James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137,

143 n. 4 (1971).

15 For a comprehensive listing of each state's enabling legislation and citations to the
pertinent constitutional provisions and major court decisions regarding them see, 3 BNA
HOUSING & DEVELOPMENT REPORTER 160:0101-160:0147 (1973).
16 The LHA is usually independent of the municipal government in the area in which it
operates. But, in Arizona, Kentucky, Michigan, New Mexico, and New York local housing

authorities are classified as dependent agencies of local governmental units. Such agencies,

when independent, are special district governments and may be coterminous with city or county
boundaries. In addition, six states (Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, South Carolina and
Vermont) have established statewide housing authorities.
17 The most commonly used term for the local administrative body is "Authority." However, in Iowa, Kentucky, and Michigan these bodies are called "Commissions." Occassionally,
the terms "Agency," "Board," and "Committee" are used.
18

MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 121, § 26K (1965) is a typical state enabling statute, and

reads: ". . . [e]very such authority shall be managed, controlledl and governed by five members, appointed or elected as provided by the [Act]." Id.
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provision allowing self-government to municipalities and counties1 9 At present,
some thirty states recognize this traditional form of local self-government and
control over community affairs. Twenty-eight states provide for home rule in
their constitutions, while an additional pair have statutory provisions granting
home rule powers to municipalities. 20 The spirit of home rule is best described
by a judicial recitation of the constitutional purposes in providing for home rule:
...to enable municipalities to conduct their own business, control their own
affairs to the fullest possible extent in their own way. It was enacted upon
the principle that the municipality itself knew better what it wanted and
needed than did the state at large, and it gave that municipality the exclusive privilege and right to enact direct legislation which would carry out
and satisfy its wants and needs.2 1

Even if home rule does not exist in a particular state, a municipality may exercise
control over the project's development through the consent requirement.
There are three additional methods by which local control can be exerted
over actions taken under the auspices of the United States Housing Act's lowincome housing program. These three methods of controlling a municipality's
consent are, (1) the use of administrative procedures such as those outlined by the
Office of Management and Budget, (2) the use of local electorate referendums,
and (3) the refusal to cooperate within the meaning of the United States Housing
Act language. While each of these methods is generally separate from the others,
situations might exist in which a combination of these methods might be ap22
propriate.

A. CircularA-95
One method available for local control of federally funded projects is
provided by Circular A-95,2 s an instructional memorandum issued by the
Federal Office of Management and Budget. The circular created what is
known as the Project Notification and Review System (PNRS). Circular A-95
attempts to expand intergovernmental cooperation in administering the existing
Federal Grant-in-Aid system. It sets procedures for the implementation of Title
IV of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 19684 and of the existing
19 Generally, home rule provides broad grants of power which cover the administration
of the municipal government and also cover the management and control of municipal property.
For a complete discussion of the area of home rule, see 1 C. ANTInAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
LAW § 3.00-.36 (1973, Supp. 1974); 4 C. ANTmAU, COUNTY LAW § 31.05 (1966, Supp. 1974).
20 For a detailed listing of all the relevant state constitution provisions see I C. ANTIEAU,
supra note 19, at 95-96.
21 Fragley v. Phelan, 126 Cal. 383, 387, 58 P. 923, 925 (1899).
22 One such situation could be hypothesized as when a local governing body refused to give
its "consent" and later acquiesced, or where a referendum was required in which approval was
given by the local voters, then the Circular A-95 review procedures would become effective
to assure that the low-income housing project conformed to any "master" plans for the development of the locality.
23 United States Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-95 (rev. Feb. 9, 1971),

entitled Evaluation Review and Coordinationof Federal or Federally Assisted Programs and

Projects [hereinafter cited as Circular A-951. See generally, Sikorsky, Local Controls Over
Federally Funded Projects, 19 N.Y. LAW FoRum 113 (1973); Testimony of Mr. Arnold Weber,
Associate Director, Office of Management and Budget, Hearing Before the United States Commission on Civil Rights 350-63, 449-83 (1971).
24 42 U.S.C. §§ 4231 et seq. (1970).
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planning requirements of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966.5 PNRS seeks to facilitate the coordination of federal, state,
and local planning and development by means of early contact with applicants for
federal assistance.
Circular A-95 allows state, regional, and metropolitan planning agencies to
condition their consent by influencing decisions on proposed federally assisted
projects which may affect their own programs. Through this review procedure,
the PNRS assures the coordination of planning and the expenditure of federal
funds in a manner most beneficial to the community as a whole."8
The citizens of the local community most affected by the proposed federally
assisted program have the right to present their views and comments upon the
application. By utilizing public hearings, the A-95 review process allows for
invaluable participation in the decision-making process by individuals or their
elected representatives.
However, unlike referendums or refusals to cooperate, Circular A-95's
procedures are advisory in nature and not a form of absolute local control. Any
LHA plans for a proposed low-income project may be revised, but there is little
potential for the complete dismissal of such plans as a result of the PNRS procedures. If a community has shown sufficient reasons, in the course of the review
process, to reject such a project then it should resort to a referendum or simply
refuse to cooperate.
B. Referendums
Referendums are a significant and valid electoral device for exercising local
control over low-income housing projects. In contrast to the PNRS, referendums
are absolute in their nature. If a proposal for a housing project requires referendum approval but fails to receive the required margin of votes, then there is
no local consent for the proposal even if the local governing body had given its
tentative approval. The "Phillips Amendment" to the First Independent Offices
Appropriations Act of 19547 permits any local governing body in the nation
to authorize a referendum in the community to determine whether public housing is needed in that community." At least 10 states use this method to control
municipal consent to low-income housing projects. These referendums require
citizen approval at various stages of the process and fall into overlapping categories.
The most common form of referendum requirement is illustrated by Article
25 42 U.S.C. §§ 3301 et seq. (1970). [Also referred to as the Demonstration Cities Act, or
the Model Cities Act].
26 Circular A-95,
5.
27 Act ofJuly 31, 1953, ch. 302, § 101, 67 Stat. 298, 306 as amended 42 U.S.C. § 1411a

(1970).
28 It is unclear whether the Phillips Amendment was meant to be permanent legislation
or not. On the basis of the legislative history and the language employed in the statutory
provision, HUD has concluded that it was meant to be permanent legislation and was not
reenacted for that reason. -ANDBOOK ON HOUSING; LAW ch. IV. pt. II at 9-10 (1973). However, a United States District Court held in the case of City of Hialeah v. United States Hous-

ing Authority, 340 F. Supp. 885 (S.D. Fla. 1971), that the Phillips Amendment expired at the
end of fiscal year 1954 due to a lack of any express language exemplifying permanency.
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XXXIV of the California Constitution,2 9 which "requires referendum approval

for any low-rent public housing project, not only for projects which will be occupied by a racial minority.""0 Other states require referendum approval whenever the locality must provide a direct loan or grant to the proposed project."
Another type of state statute permits referendums on proposed projects but does
not make a referendum mandatory. Under this type of statute a referendum may
be initiated by the local governing body. 2 The third method of voter approval
is characterized by state laws which require a referendum before a local housing
3
authority may even be created.
Cases discussing alleged discrimination associated with these referendum
requirements may be grouped into two general categories. Within the first
category are cases regarding the validity of state constitutional provisions, referendums, or enactments of local governments which attempt to establish a "negative policy" toward open housing by restricting governmental interference with an
individual's right to dispose of real property. Reitman v.Mulkey 4 sought to
validate such a negative policy embodied in Article I, § 26 of the California
Constitution which was enacted as an initiative measure by the people of California as Proposition 14 in a statewide ballot in 1964. The United States
Supreme Court rejected Article I, § 26, saying that "Proposition 14 invalidly
involved the State in racial discriminations in the housing market."35
Shortly after Reitman, the Supreme Court invalidated another government's
"negative policy" toward open housing in Hunter v. Erickson. 6 In Hunter, the
citizens of Akron, Ohio, amended their city's charter to require that any ordinance
regulating real estate on the basis of race, color, religion or national origin could
not take effect without approval of a majority of those voting in a city election.
Any other housing ordinances would take effect without the necessity of having
to survive any special mandatory referendum. Hunter, therefore, rested on the
conclusion that Akron's referendum law denied equal protection of the laws by
placing "special burdens on racial minorities within the governmental process."3 7
The second category of referendum cases relates to the validity of state constitutional provisions or local government enactments which require submission
29 Article XXXIV was held to be constitutional by the United States Supreme Court in
James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
30 James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. at 141.
31 See, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 421.53, 421.54 (1973); MR. RzV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 4701
(1964); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 462.465 (1963). Other states establish different criteria for
imposing the mandatory referendum requirement on housing projects. For instance, in Montana
[MONT. REy. CoD s ANN. §§ 35-104, 35-109 (1961)], Nebraska [NEu. Rav. STAT. §§ 71-1504,
71-1507 (1971)], and Oklahoma [OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 1055-56 (1973)] a referendum is required only in cities with a population of less than 200,000. While in South
Dakota [S.D. COMPiLED LAws ANN. §§ 11-7-50, 11-7-51 (1967)] only third-class cities are not
held to the state's referendum requirement. Mississippi [1Miss. CoDE ANN. §§ 7322-21-7322-25 (1972)] requires a 3/5 (60 percent) vote rather than a simple majority for approval.
32 In Minnesota, this applies only for projects which do not require any local loan or
direct grant as a condition for federal assistance. If a local or grant is one condition to the
implementation of the proposed project, the Minnesota municipality is held to the mandaory referendum requirement. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 462.465 (1963).
33 See, MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 35-104, 35-109 (1961); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 36-4,
36-4.1 (1970).
34 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
35 Id. at 375.
36 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
37 Id. at 391.

NOTES
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of fair or open-housing proposals to a public referendum for voter approval.
This category of cases may be exemplified by James u. Valtienrr s and Spaulding
v. Blair."
James v. Valtierrainvolved a challenge to California's Constitution, Article
XXXIV. That article required a local referendum before any governmental
body could acquire or develop any low-income housing project. The Supreme
Court distinguished Valtierrafrom the situation in Hunter by saying that "unlike
the Akron referendum provision, it cannot be said that California's Article
XXXIV rests on 'distinctions based on race.' " 0 The Court found that the
record would not support a claim that such a provision, seemingly neutral on its
face, was in fact aimed at racial minorities.41
The Court found that "[p]rovisions for referendums
demonstrate devotion
'4 2
prejudice."
or
discrimination,
bias,
to
not
democracy,
to
[R]eferendum approval of low-rent public housing projects... ensures that
all the people of a community will have a voice in a decision which may
lead to large expenditures of local governmental funds for increased public
services and to lower tax revenues. It gives them a voice in decisions that
will affect the future development of their own community. 43
This case law supports the right of a municipal population to use this electoral
device to reject the establishment of a low-income housing project within its
boundaries without a violation of the equal protection clause.
If a state makes statutory provision for referendums with respect to questions of consent to a low-income housing project, the neutrality of the statutory
language will determine its lawfulness. If the referendum fails, then the voters'
refusal to consent to the project is absolute. A municipality in a state without
statutory referendum provisions may forcefully and absolutely refuse its consent
for a proposed low-income housing project by simply refusing to cooperate.
0. Consent Requirements
The final method of local control relies upon the consent requirements of the
United States Housing Act. The public housing program's enabling statute
requires some approval or consent by the third party affected by a federally
funded project. HUD will not make any preliminary loans, any contracts for
loans, or any contracts for annual contributions with a local housing authority
unless the governing body of the locality has given its consent to the development
of a low-income housing project within the community.
38 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
39 403 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1968).
40 402 U.S. at 141.
41 Id.
42 Id.

43 Id. at 143. See, Spaulding v. Blair, 403 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1968). In another case
involving referendums and low-income housing projects, the Ninth Circuit held that referendums
not based upon explicit racial classifications should be upheld. Sze, Southern Alameda Spanish
Speaking Organization (SASSO) v. City of Union City, California, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir.
1.970).
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Consent must be given in two ways by the local governing body. The first
method of consent" is for the governing body of the locality to pass a resolution
approving the local housing authority's application for a preliminary loan to pay
for the surveys and planning for the proposed low-income housing project. The
second method of consen 5 requires that, before HUD will contract for loans
(other than preliminary loans) or for annual contributions, the local, housing
authority must have entered into a "Cooperation Agreement" with the local governing body.
The time when the city might halt the project is before it has given the
approval which authorizes the authority to proceed to make applications for
and procure the federal loans.... The city is given the power to prevent a
project's being initiated, and no project under the state and federal laws may
be commenced or loans made without its approval and entry into a cooperation agreement.
III. Mahaley v. Cuyahoga MetropolitanHousing Authority
Mahaley v. Cuyahoga MetropolitanHousing Authority47 is the first case to
test specifically a local governing body's right to control the location and development of federally assisted housing projects by its refusal to enter into the required
cooperation agreement contract. In Mahaley, the constitutionality of the cooperation agreement requirements of the United States Housing Act were challenged
by a class of low-income residents of the Greater Cleveland Area.48 The plaintiffs
sought a declaration that the cooperation agreement requirements were unconstitutional and an order compelling five suburban communities to construct lowincome housing units. The threshold question was whether this "required consent" can be properly refused by a local governing body without denying equal
protection of the laws; whether the right of refusal requires a compelling governmental interest became the paramount issue.
A three-judge district court held that the local consent requirements,
specifically the cooperation agreement, were constitutional both on their face and
as applied. However, the question of whether the defendants had used the statutory consent requirement as a tool to perpetuate segregation was referred to a
44 42 U.S.C. § 1415(7) (a) (i) (1970).
45 42 U.S.C. § 1415(7) (b)(i) (1970).
46 Housing Authority v. City of Los Angeles, 38 Cal. 2d 853, 865-66, 243 P.2d 515, 521
(1952).
47 In discussing Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority in this note, citation is made to three different court decisions of the case. The decision of the three-judge
district court which found the cooperation agreement requirement of the United States Housing
Act to be constitutional is 355 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D. Ohio 1973). The decision of the singlejudge district court regarding the question of discrimination by the defendant municipalities
is 355 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Ohio 1973). The circuit court of appeals' reversal of the single
judge's decision is 500 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1974).
48 The constitutionality of the United States Housing Act of 1937 was upheld by the
United States Supreme Court's decision in City of Cleveland v. United States, 323 U.S. 329
(1945). However, the City of Cleveland case was decided in 1945 and passed only on the
validity of the United States Housing Act of 1937 prior to its amendment by the Housing Act
of 1949, 63 Stat. 413, which added the present cooperation agreement requirement now

codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1415(7) (b) (1970).
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single judge (Chief Judge Frank J. Battisti)."' Without a further evidentiary
hearing, Chief Judge Battisti held that the defendant municipalities, by failing
to enter into cooperation agreements, had used the statutory requirements as a
shield to protect their inhabitants from integration by low-income minority
5
persons. 0
Chief Judge Battisti ordered the defendant, Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA), to prepare and submit to the court within 90 days a
plan reflecting the "need" for low-income housing within each municipality of
Cuyahoga County. Before CMHA submitted its plan to the district court,
counsel for the defendant municipalities filed for a stay of the district court's
order and for appeal of the single judge's determination.
The Sixth Circuit held that the statutory requirement of a cooperation
agreement between the local governing body and the local housing agency was
constitutional both on its face and as applied.5 However, the court also held
that the single judge's finding of a violation of the plaintiff's civil rights was "utterly inconsistent" with the three-judge panel's decision. 2 The court stated that
since the United States Housing Act of 1937 was constitutional and constitutionally applied by the defendant municipalities, the plaintiffs had no cognizable
civil rights claim.13 The plaintiffs could have maintained their civil rights claim
only if the court had held the act to be unconstitutional or unconstitutionally
applied by local officials."' It was also noted that since there is no constitutional
right to public housing in one's own city, there is no right to public housing in a
55
municipality in which the plaintiff does not reside.
It should be noted that at the same time that the Sixth Circuit decided
Mahaley v. CMHA, the Second Circuit decided Aceveda v. Naussau County,
New York,5" dealing with similar issues on the right to housing. The Second
Circuit held that the county and its officials had no constitutional or statutory
duty to provide low-income housing 7 just as there was "no constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality." ' The Second Circuit said
that although the county had instituted a plan which would have benefited
minority groups and promoted integration, it was not compelled to undertake
the plan in the first place. 9 Therefore, the court held that the imposition of an
affirmative duty to construct housing, as the plaintiffs sought, was "clearly not
required by any provisions of the Constitution"6 or the Fair Housing Act of
19681
49 355 F. Supp., at 1250. In reference to the procedural matters of three-judge district
courts, specifically the propriety of their referral of a matter to a single judge, see Rosado v.
Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970). See afso, King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
50 355 F. Supp. at 1268.
51 500 F.2d at 1092.

52 Id.

53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 1093; see Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
56 500 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1974). Mahaley was decided on July 9, 1974, while Acevedo
was decided one week earlier, July 2, 1974.

57 500 F.2d at 1080-81.
58 Id. at 1081; see Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
59 500 F.2d at 1081.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 1082.
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IV. Constitution Aspects
What degree of judicial review must a municipality's refusal to enter a
cooperation agreement satisfy in order to avoid violating the equal protection
clause? Initially, because the federal low-income housing program rests on a
legal foundation of both federal and state legislation, analysis of the constitutional
questions which arose in Mahaley must begin with the Supremacy Clause.
A. Supremacy Clause
The Supremacy Clause"2 applies only if a state law conflicts with a federal
law and, in such instances, the federal law controls.6" In Mahaley, there was no
conflict of federal and state law given the court's interpretation of the cooperation
agreement requirement of the United States Housing Act. The Sixth Circuit
quoted Justice Black's decision in James v. Valtierra:
By the Housing Act of 1937 the Federal Government has offered aid to
state and local governments for the creation of low-rent public housing.
However, the federal legislation does not purport to require that local governments accept this or to outlaw referendums on whether the aid should be
accepted [emphasis added].6
By exercising its constitutional powers over the general welfare and spending, Congress has enacted a valid statutory provision requiring that a cooperation
agreement be entered before HUD will approve any LHA's application for financial assistance. Congress determined that local decisions and cooperation were
essential to effectuate the low-income housing program.65 The constitutionally
valid United States Housing Act, with its cooperation agreement requirement of
§ 1415(7) (b) (i), must prevail if it conflicts with any state's housing authority
laws. Therefore, neither the defendant municipalities nor any other community
may constitutionally be compelled to accept the offer of federal aid.
6
B. Equal Protection"

The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment was designed to
62 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 provides that "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ...
shall be the supreme Law of the
Land.... "
63 A state law will be void under the Supremacy Clause if it would retard, impede, burden,
or otherwise stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress in enacting the federal law. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316 (1819). Even where the conflicting state law was enacted for some valid purpose and was
not intended to frustrate federal law, it will be held void. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637
(1971)..
64 500 F.2d at 1091.
65 Congress has reaffirmed its belief in the continued appropriateness of local determination of need and cooperation in the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-383, § 5(e) (2), 88 Stat. 653. This bill was enacted after the Sixth Circuit's decision
in Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority.
66 For a general discussion of the entire area of the law and a complete background of
the standards of judicial review employed by the courts in cases involving equal protection
claims, see Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972).
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safeguard citizens from governmental actions implementing discriminatory legislation and from governmental inaction resulting in invidious discrimination. However, this theory does not preclude some classification between groups of people,
where it is essential to efficient functioning of the state. The standard of review
in equal protection cases depends upon both the nature of the classification and
the importance of the interest affected. During the past few years, the courts have
found virtually every phase of the administration of public welfare and public
housing to be governed by the requirements of the fourteenth amendment6
In Mahaley, the threshold question was whether there is an equal protection
problem when an impecunious person is denied access to public low-income
housing by a municipality's refusal to enter into a cooperation agreement with
the LHA. As noted, the policy of the federal low-income housing program is
to make decent, safe, and sanitary housing available to all persons without regard
to racial considerations. But, because of the current nature of American society,
the majority of those persons eligible to reside in federally subsidized low-income
housing, especially in major urban areas, are almost always Blacks. Therefore,
the characterization of the groups of people involved in Mahaley becomes significant. The choice of classification, either "wealth" or "race," will be reflected
in the standard of judicial review which is applied.
While race may be an important factor in characterizing the tenants and
potential tenants of many of the federally assisted low-income housing projects,
it is not the criterion upon which eligibility for participation in the program is
based. HUD's regulations and each LHA's income limits determine eligibility.6"
Therefore, race cannot be the relevant classification in cases like Mahaley for
purposes of selecting which standard of judicial review should be applied in
deciding any equal protection issues. The United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York set down in its decision in Citizens Committee for
Faraday Wood v. Lindsay,6 9 the most current judicial opinion on this matter.
While noting that the standard of review in equal protection cases is unclear,
the court held that "[a]bsent [a] prima facie showing of racial discrimination
or the denial of a fundamental constitutional right, the courts continue to apply
the 'rational basis' test.... ,
In many federal housing program cases, the close correlation between the
tenants' and potential tenants' racial characteristics and economic status has
been used to argue for equating these two characteristics and thus requiring the
courts to use "strict scrutiny" applied to suspect classifications. However, there
are major theoretical obstacles to linking "wealth" to race as a "suspect classification."'" Some of the obstacles are the positive value that society places upon
67 E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing
Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969), aff'd 486 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 922 (1971). See generally, Comment, Equal Protection as a Measure of
Compelling Interest in Welfare Legislation, 21 Mn. L. Rav. 175 (1969).
68 Under 42 U.S.C. § 1410(g) (1970), LHA's are empowered to establish income limits
and other criteria of eligibility.
69 362 F. Supp. 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
70 Id. at 659.
71 For full discussion of this concept see Note, James v. Valtierra: Housing Discrimination
by Referendum? 39 U. O H. L. Rav. 115 (1971). See also Saeger, Tight Little Islands:
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distinctions of wealth, the traditional state-imposed financial prerequisites for
the enjoyment of certain services and activities, the belief that poverty is remediable, the difficulty in determining exactly what constitutes poverty, and the difficulty in defining the limits on substantive areas to which equal protection should
apply. Since wealth, in contrast to race, is a relative factor, the level of income
at which a person becomes entitled to government-provided services is largely
discretionary.
While these arguments were being made in federal housing program cases
to link wealth to race, other cases and commentary have sought recognition of
wealth as a new category of suspect classification- and housing as a fundamental
right. Several Supreme Court decisions have been interpreted as suggesting that
de jure wealth classifications were "suspect" and presumptively unconstitutional. 2
However, wealth has not been judicially recognized as a suspect classification as
witnessed by the Supreme Court's rejection of the concept in James v. Valtierra.
Except for Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Valtierra7 3 wealth has only
been classified as "traditionally disfavored." 74
"Fundamental interests" involve any interest in a matter clearly basic to a
decent life. This general definition includes decent housing as defined in the
Housing Act of 1937. However, in Lindsey v. Normet,75 the United States
Supreme Court rejected arguments that the "need for decent shelter" was a
fundamental interest, requiring a more stringent standard of review than mere
rationality. In that case the Court stated:
We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social
and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that document any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality.... Absent
constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing ... [is a] legislative, not [a] judicial [function]. 7
Therefore, the district court in Citizens Committee for Faraday Wood v. Lindsay
accurately described the status of the law when it said "[h]owever necessary
housing may be it still falls within the area denominated by the Supreme Court
as 'economic and social welfare' and not the area carved out for special scrutiny
known as 'fundamental rights.' ,
The Supreme Court has long recognized "that the Fourteenth Amendment
permits the states a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some
groups of citizens differently than others."7 " The Court recognized that "in the
area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal ProtecExclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. Rav. 767, 785-87
(1969).
72 See McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802, 807
(1969); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353, 355-58 (1963).
73 402 U.S. at 144-45.
74 See Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
75 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
76 Id. at 74.
77 362 F. Supp. at 659-60.
78 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
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tion Clause merely because the classification made by its laws is imperfect. If
the classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the Constitution
simply because the classification 'is not made with mathematical nicety or because
in practice it results in some inequality' .... 'A statutory discrimination will not
be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.'

2,79

Consequently, the minimal rationality test has frequently been applied in the area
of economic, and social welfare legislation."0 However, this "rational relationship"
test requires only minimal judicial scrutiny of the legislation or state action. This
minimal analysis, reflected in McGowan v. Maryland,8 can be limited to even a
hypothetical rather than a factual situation.
The strict scrutiny standard of judicial review reserved for equal protection
issues involving suspect classifications and fundamental rights under the Constitution does not apply in cases like Mahaley. This type of case, dealing with a
municipality's denial of the requisite consent for a low-income housing project
by refusing to enter a cooperation agreement, clearly falls within the general area
of law delineated as "economic and social welfare." Because the courts cannot
demand a "compelling governmental interest" as justification for the municipality's actions, under the "two-tier" approach to the equal protection scheme they
must apply the reasonable relation or mere rationality test. The isolated decision
to refuse to enter into a cooperation agreement must be judged according to the
rational relationship test of the traditional equal protection clause as to whether
it does or does not violate the fourteenth amendment.
However, judicial dissatisfaction with the limitations of the two-tier approach in instances where the strict scrutiny standard did not apply, and yet the
mere rationality test seemed inappropriate, has created a third, intermediate
standard of judicial review. This newest standard of equal protection, the
"sliding-scale" or the "means-evaluation" test, considers such factors as: (1) the
importance of the interests the state action is attempting to promote or protect,
(2) the importance and character of the interests adversely effected, (3) the
substantiality of the connection between the legislative classification and the legitimate purpose to be served, and (4) the alternative means for accomplishing those
purposes.8 2 The sliding-scale or means-evaluation test has been applied in some
form by the Supreme Court in a variety of cases, including sex discrimination, "
recoupment of legal defense fees expended on behalf of indigents,s4 picketing,"
and exclusionary zoning."
79 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
80 See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Daniel v. Family Security
Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949); Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580
(1935); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
81 366 U.S. at 426: "A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it." Id.
82 The component factors for such an inquiry were suggested in Van Alstyne, Student
Academic Freedom and the Rule Making Powers of Public Universities: Some Constitutional
Considerations,2 LAw iN TRANSITION Q. 1, 28-29 (1965). For a full discussion of the judicial
development of this "sliding-scale" of rationality test, see Gunther, supra note 66.
83 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
84 James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
85 Police Dep't of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
86 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). See, United States Dep't of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), sections of the Food Stamp Act of 1964;
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), residency requirements for state college tuition pur-
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If the issues involved in Mahaley are to be scrutinized under any method of
analysis stronger than the mere rationality test, they must be reviewed under a
sliding-scale or means-evaluation test. Congress has recognized and supported
the concepts of a local determination of need and the absolute prerequisite of
consent through a cooperation agreement; there are no other alternatives."7 Also,
the close connection between the legislative classification of those involved in the
federal housing program and the legitimate purpose served by the program is
readily apparent. The United States Housing Act has long been determined
to be a proper exercise of congressional power, 8 and, in light of the need for
adequate decent housing, those least able to afford housing without federal
assistance are those who benefit from the program. The importance of the
plalntiffs' interests in Mahaley has already been established. While there may be
a need for decent housing, especially for the poor, access to housing of a
particular quality is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution."9
Only the first factor requires further examination. Under this test courts
should not ask whether there is any reason to justify the municipality's action
but rather should inquire into the particular importance of the interest sought
to be protected. In Mahaley, the defendant municipalities advanced arguments
regarding the financial burdens and obligations imposed by participation in the
federal low-income housing program. 0 Based upon a showing of due deliberation of the question of need for such housing and a consideration of the financial
burdens placed on a municipality by cooperating, the greatest weight must fall on
this factor. Therefore, even when balancing the interests of the parties as the
sliding-scale or means-evaluation test does, a municipality's denial of consent by
refusing to enter into a cooperation agreement could not be found to violate the
Equal Protection Clause.
V. Conclusion
Courts have not and should not impose upon state and local governing
bodies the affirmative duty to provide adequate housing for all persons, regardless
of wealth. The Acevedo9 case, through its attack on a similar type of situation as
arose in Mahaley v. CMHA,9 2 gives significant judicial recognition to local control as to participation in optional programs for low-income housing. If the governmental interest to be justified is local control over federally financed projects,
poses; Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), pretrial commitment of the mentally incompetent; Weber v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), rights of illegitimates;
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), distribution of contraceptives.
87 See, note 65 supra.
88 City of Cleveland v. United States, 323 U.S. 329 (1945).
89 Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
90 The economic and financial burdens imposed upon a municipality by the contractual
obligations of participating in the federal low-income housing program can be substantial.
In cases like Mahaley where the proposed site is removed from the main part of the community,
it is particularly expensive to provide all the requisite utilities, roads, and other services
to the project than for an urban project. If a city cannot generate sufficient revenues from a
low-income housing project to pay for its services, then the city may have to raise its taxes or
incur more outstanding debt.
91 500 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1974).
92 500 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1974).
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then the least onerous alternative? 3 is already provided by the Housing Act. This
local control is provided through local legislative approval of each proposed
housing project and cooperation agreement contracts with the LHA.9 '
The Sixth Circuit relied in part upon the Supreme Court's decision in
James v. Valterra with respect to the interpretation of the consent requirements
of the United States Housing Act. After reciting the Supreme Court's reasons
for the propriety of local determinations, the Sixth Circuit concluded:
The Supreme Court thus construed the plain language of the Act to
mean exactly what it says, namely, that it is for the municipalities to decide
whether they need low-rent housing and whether they desire to sign cooperation agreements. There is no basis to infer discrimination upon the
part of a municipality for doing what it has a lawful right to do under the
express provisions of the Housing Act. 95
Federal housing policies rest on the basic principle that if a municipality does
not want federally assisted housing, it should not have it imposed upon it. 8
These federal statutes and policies recognize that, although the housing problem
is national in its scope, the factors determining patterns of housing and community development are complex and many are uniquely local in nature. The
primary responsibility for local problems must rest with the local community;
the need for any kind of housing action should be determined locally. Therefore,
any determination of a lack of need for housing action in a municipality, exhibited by a refusal to enter into a cooperation agreement contract, should be
judged by a rational relation rather than a strict scrutiny test. If there is a
reasonable basis for that determination, there is no violation of equal protection
of the laws.
Jeffrey A. Gardner

93 See, Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,

196 (1964).
94 42 U.S.C. § 1415(7) (1970); see generally, Note, Low-Income Housing and the Equal
Protection Clause, 56 CoRNELL L. REv. 343, 363-64 (1971).

95 500 F.2d at 1092.
96

"Statement of the President on Federal Policies Relative to Equal Housing Oppor-

tunities," issued June 11, 1971, Public Papers of the Presidentsof the United States: Richard
Nixon 721, 722.

